Mariano Browne
Trinidad and Tobago has been in the oil business for approximately 125 years. It has been the home of several small refineries (Santa Flora, La Brea, and Point Fortin), which were all closed over time as they became non-viable due to ageing technology or supply and cost challenges. The early refineries processed local crude, whilst the Shell refinery in Point Fortin processed a mixture of local crude and imported crude. The largest refinery was acquired by Texaco in 1956 and upgraded to process mainly imported Middle Eastern crude, blended with local crude for export to the United States East Coast. Its rated capacity was 360,000 barrels of oil a day (BOPD).
After Independence, as energy companies exited the market at various times, the GORTT acquired their assets and, as a result, formed separate state enterprises: Trintopec, Trintoc, and Trinmar Ltd. Petrotrin was established in 1993 by the merger of Trintopec and Trintoc. Trinmar Ltd was merged into Petrotrin in 2000. The Point Fortin refinery was closed in 1993, leaving only the Point A Pierre refinery. Some inefficient plants/units at Point-a-Pierre were closed, reducing refinery capacity to 170,000 bopd.
It is important to note that, contrary to popular opinion, the refinery was never able to successfully refine the “sweet” crude produced on T&T’s east coast, as the blending required was either incompatible with the existing plant configuration or too expensive. As a result, the East Coast “sweet crude” has always been exported. Further, the refinery’s fuel output was largely exported, with local market demand accounting for only 15% of total output, or 25,000 bopd. Therefore, to be successful, a refinery operating in T&T needs to successfully export the majority of its output.
Market conditions never remain stable, and at the same time, international regulations were changing from 2000 onwards, requiring fuel specifications to meet emission standards in keeping with the demand for “clean air.” As a result, since the Petrotrin refinery’s configuration did not produce fuel of the required quality, it undertook a series of projects to meet these new, higher standards for improved fuel quality by reducing sulphur content and increasing octane and cetane ratings.
Unfortunately, few of these projects proved successful. They were also financed by borrowing. This coincided with a period of low oil prices, which led to declining margins as the lower-quality output could not command the margins required to sustain the refinery’s operations, and depressed Petrotrin’s financial results, resulting in operating losses. Because of this, Petrotin was restructured in 2018. The aim of the restructuring was to close the refinery and prevent the refinery’s losses from affecting the rest of the business (production and distribution).
Since 2018, the corporate structure has consisted of a “parent” or holding company, Trinidad Petroleum Holdings Limited, which holds the debt and owns the subsidiaries. Specifically, the subsidiaries are: Heritage Petroleum Company Limited, which owns the oil reserves and explores, produces, and sells crude oil; Paria Fuel Trading, which is responsible for importing and distributing refined fuel products; and Guaracara Refining Company Limited, which owns the refinery and related land assets. This structure delineates each company’s role within the group.
Despite several sales attempts, the refinery remains idle and distressed, requiring costly and complex preparations before any restart. This challenge cannot be avoided, even with a state joint venture. Additionally, aligning the plant with international fuel standards is essential. Although stand-alone refineries exist, industry trends favour integrated complexes that streamline raw material supply.
The costs of establishing an oil refinery vary widely depending on scale, complexity, location, feedstock, product slate, regulatory environment, and whether you build a greenfield or brownfield plant or upgrade an existing plant. While a new refinery costs billions, so does an upgrade. Which market will this refinery serve, and what is the competition like? More importantly, where will the feedstock come from, Venezuela, Guyana or elsewhere? This is critical, as no refinery can operate without a raw material source.
Global demand for crude oil is roughly 100 million barrels a day(mb/d) and is expected to peak at 125 million by 2050. In relation to this demand, as of 2024–2025, there are approximately 700-825 operational oil refineries worldwide (Statista). Those interested in detailed data can refer to the Oil & Gas Journal, which publishes an annual worldwide list of refineries with a country-by-country tabulation. Continuing into early 2026, global oil refinery capacity stands at approximately 103.66 mb/d, while total refinery throughput reaches about 86.89 mb/d.
The sector is experiencing moderate growth, with capacity, particularly in Asia-Pacific, Africa, and the Middle East, expected to rise to meet growing demand. Furthermore, the industry is experiencing capacity growth, with an additional 181 refineries planned or under construction between 2024 and 2030, driven largely by economic expansion in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East.
By region, from 2024 to 2030, Africa is expected to add the most announced and planned refineries, with 70, followed by Asia and the Middle East, with 46 and 30, respectively. These proposed refineries are expected to contribute 20.75 mb/d of crude distillation unit (CDU) capacity worldwide during this period. To compete in a well-served US market or in Latin America, any plant must offer an efficient product mix and a stable, long-term supply source.
Mariano Browne is the chief executive officer of the UWI Arthur Lok Jack Global School of Business.
