With the State of Emergency (SoE) scheduled to end today, the country is finally able to exhale after months of heightened security. Yet an uncomfortable truth remains: the SoE bought time, not transformation. What happens next will determine whether the gains recorded in 2025 endure—or evaporate.
There is no denying that the year-end crime numbers told a hopeful story. Murders fell sharply to about 369, the lowest figure in over a decade and roughly a 42 per cent drop compared to 2024. There were downward trends in other serious crimes, with shootings and woundings reduced by about 40 per cent, and robberies and break-ins significantly down.
Much of that progress was attributed to intelligence-driven policing and sustained operations against violent groups.
The SoE, proclaimed by President Christine Kangaloo on July 18, was based on urgent intelligence about a coordinated criminal network operating within the prison system.
The Trinidad and Tobago Police Service reported that incarcerated individuals were orchestrating targeted attacks against senior police officers, judicial officials, DPP staff and prison officers. Faced with such an immediate and grave threat, the SoE was arguably unavoidable.
However, the start of 2026 was a sobering reminder that emergency powers do not eliminate violence: they only suppress it temporarily. The new year opened with multiple homicides, including at least five murders in the first days of January in Port-of-Spain and other areas. While the overall trajectory remains downward, serious incidents continue to scar communities, underscoring that the underlying drivers of crime remain intact.
Chief among those drivers are organised gangs, firearms and the narcotics trade. Structured criminal networks, deeply embedded in certain communities and institutions, cannot be dismantled solely by stop-and-search powers. Nor can they be neutralised without confronting chronic weaknesses in the justice system—low detection rates, prolonged court backlogs and a persistent perception of impunity that erodes public trust.
This is where the national conversation must now shift. The debate over Zones of Special Operations (ZOSOs), reignited by the Government’s failed attempt to pass enabling legislation before the SoE expired, exposed a deeper problem: the absence of consensus on long-term crime solutions.
Jamaica’s experience with ZOSOs, as articulated by its Foreign Affairs Minister Kamina Johnson Smith, offers lessons worth studying—not copying blindly, but adapting carefully. There, targeted policing was paired with social intervention, human rights training for officers, parliamentary oversight, sunset clauses and community buy-in. Crucially, ZOSOs were treated as one tool in a broader ecosystem, not a silver bullet.
The rejection of the ZOSO bill does not leave the country defenceless. As Deputy Commissioner of Police Junior Benjamin noted, the TTPS continues to operate within the established crime prevention, detection and conviction framework. But optimism that 2026 could be one of the safest years on record must be matched with political will beyond the police service.
International perceptions, reinforced by travel advisories and unfavourable comparisons to high-crime cities, will not change through emergency declarations alone. Sustainable safety requires prison reform, judicial efficiency, police accountability, youth intervention and social investment in communities that produce a disproportionate share of violence.
The SoE may have steadied the ship, but steering it to safer waters demands more than emergency navigation. Trinidad and Tobago cannot govern crime as a perpetual crisis. Long-term solutions are no longer optional—they are overdue.
